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Abstract
Near Field Communication (NFC) has enabled mobile
phones to emulate contactless smart cards. Similar to
contactless smart cards, they are also susceptible to re-
lay attacks. To counter these, a number of methods have
been proposed that rely primarily on ambient sensors as
a proximity detection mechanism (also known as an anti-
relay mechanism). In this paper, we, for the first time in
academic literature, empirically evaluate a comprehen-
sive set of ambient sensors for their effectiveness as a
proximity detection mechanism. We selected 15 out of a
total of 17 sensors available via the Google Android plat-
form for evaluation, with the other two sensors unavail-
able on widely-used handsets. In existing academic liter-
ature, only 5 sensors have been proposed with positive
results as a potential proximity detection mechanism.
Each sensor, where feasible, was used to record the mea-
surements of 1000 contactless transactions at four differ-
ent physical locations. A total of 252 random users, ran-
dom sample of the university student population, were
involved during the field trails. The analysis of these
transactions provides an empirical foundation to categor-
ically answer whether ambient sensors provide a strong
proximity detection mechanism for security sensitive ap-
plications like banking, transport and high-security ac-
cess control. After careful analysis, we conclude that
no single evaluated mobile ambient sensor is suitable for
such critical applications in realistic deployment scenar-
ios. Lastly, we identify a number of potential avenues
that may improve their effectiveness.
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1 Introduction
Contactless smart cards are deployed in a multitude of
applications, ranging from banking, transport and ac-
cess control [32], and their awareness and acceptance
is increasing, particularly in the banking sector [12].
While the acceptance of the contactless cards is growing,
mobile (contactless) payments are also gaining accep-
tance, particularly “among early adopters and young age
groups” [13]. In such mobile payments, Near Field Com-
munication (NFC) provides the medium through which
to emulate a contactless smart card; Deliotte projected
in early 2015 that five percent of 600-650 million NFC-
enabled mobile phones will be used at least once a month
in 20151 to make a contactless payment [9]. We can
reasonably assume, therefore, that mobile payments will
be a significant payment medium in the future, poten-
tially overtaking contactless smart cards. Although the
above discussion is limited to the financial industry, sim-
ilar trends are being observed in other domains where
contactless smart cards are deployed [5].
Contactless smart cards, however, are susceptible to
relay attacks [24, 25, 29], as are NFC-enabled mobile
phones [22, 21, 31, 35]. A relay attack is a passive
man-in-the-middle attack in which an attacker extends
the distance between a genuine payment terminal (point-
of-service) and genuine contactless smart card (or NFC-
enabled mobile device). This attack can enable a mali-
cious user to access services for which the genuine user
is eligible, such as paying for goods or accessing a build-
ing with physical access controls.
Quantifying the number of fraudulent activities where
relay attacks were employed (on both smart card and
NFC mobile phones) is a challenging task. Evidence ex-
ists, however, that academic work dealing with attacks
1Actual figures for 2015 were not available at the time of
writing this paper. However, early forecasts for the global mar-
ket of mobile payment for 2016 and beyond are available at
http://www.nfcworld.com/technology/forecast/
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on smart cards have been adopted by real-world crimi-
nals [19]. In the domain of contactless smart cards, a
potentially effective countermeasure has been distance
bounding protocols [26, 36]. For NFC-enabled phones,
anti-relay mechanisms – at least in academic literature –
have comprised largely of ambient sensing (Section 2).
In this paper, we investigate the ambient sensors avail-
able through the Google Android platform and construct
a test-bed environment (Section 3) to evaluate their ef-
fectiveness as proximity detection mechanism for NFC-
based contactless transactions (Section 5). Additionally,
we evaluate each individual sensor in relation to their
technical feasibility, report any challenges that were en-
countered during implementation (Section 4), and inves-
tigate issues affecting usability and reliability. The aim
of this work is to provide empirical evidence of each am-
bient sensor’s suitability as a proximity detection mech-
anism and investigating whether it can counter potential
relay attacks effectively (Section 6).
The suitability of a proximity detection mechanism
for critical applications, such as banking, transport and
(high-security) access control – the main focus of this
paper – is based on its ability to uniquely pair measure-
ments taken from a payment terminal and a payment in-
strument (or mobile handset in this case). This is to pro-
vide confidence that the two devices were truly in close
proximity (≈ 3cm) to each other. This measurement pair
should be unique in a manner such that no other mea-
surements can be paired successfully with the terminal
or payment instrument’s measurements. That is to say,
for an effective proximity detection mechanism that can
thwart relay attacks, the device measurements generated
during a transaction should be unique to that transac-
tion. Given a pair of measurements from two devices,
PT and PI, representing the measurement from the pay-
ment terminal and the payment instrument respectively,
the mechanism (and associated ambient sensor) is con-
sidered effective if it can uniquely pair PT with PI. No
other measurement, PT’ or PI’, can have the potential
to be paired successfully with either PT and/or PI, thus
providing a strong proof of proximity. If there is a high
likelihood that PT’ or PI’, taken at different time or loca-
tion, can be paired with PT and/or PI, then it is difficult
for an entity (a third party or a payment terminal) to as-
certain which device(s) were in actual proximity to each
other. This gap, where a transaction cannot be identified
to have a unique measurement pair, is what a malicious
user may exploit to mount a relay attack.
In this paper, we continue to refer to contactless mo-
bile payments due to the associated financial repercus-
sions, and the attention this may attract from malicious
actors. However, the discussion in this paper is equally
relevant towards the deployment of contactless mobile-
based solutions in other domains, such as transport and
access control.
There are three primary contributions of this paper:
1. A test-bed architecture and implementation that can
be used to evaluate various sensors on Google An-
droid devices.
2. A data analysis framework and methodology for
evaluating ambient sensor measurements.
3. An empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of am-
bient sensors as a proximity detection mechanism.
This evaluation provides a foundation towards de-
ciding which sensors to deploy in a target environ-
ment.
The implementation of the test-bed, data analysis and
collected data sets are being made available online at
http://anonymised.
2 Ambient Sensing in Mobile Payments
In this section, we briefly describe mobile phone-based
contactless payments, relay attacks and a generic archi-
tecture for deploying ambient sensing as proximity de-
tection mechanism to counter relay attacks.
2.1 Contactless Mobile Devices and Relay
Attacks
Distance bounding protocols in smart cards are closely
integrated with the physical layer [26]. Usually, the over-
all architecture and process is the same with minor differ-
ences, whether the intended purpose of the smart cards is
financial payments, transportation, access control or an-
other domain. The major differences reside in the higher-
level protocols and algorithms that implement the se-
mantics of each application. In this section we examine
contactless transactions in relation to NFC-based mobile
payments; however, the overall architecture is common
across all deployment domains.
Figure 1: Overview of a Relay Attack
When a user brings their NFC-enabled mobile phone
close to a contactless payment terminal, the NFC in the
mobile handset enters the radio frequency range around
a payment terminal through which it can initiate a dia-
logue. During a contactless transaction, physical contact
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Figure 2: Generic Deployments of Ambient Sensors as Proximity Detection Mechanism
is not necessary and, in many cases, a second factor of
authentication, e.g. biometrics or Personal Identification
Number (PIN), is not mandatory [10]. As a result, it is
difficult to ascertain that an authorised user brought the
mobile device near the terminal via a relay. It should be
noted, however, that the use of a PIN or biometric may
not counter a relay attack effectively in certain situations
(notably the Mafia fraud attack [16]).
In a relay attack, shown in Figure 1, an attacker must
emulate a malicious payment terminal to a genuine user
and a masquerading payment instrument (mobile phone)
to a genuine payment terminal. The goal of the malicious
actor is to extend the physical distance of the communi-
cation channel between the victim’s mobile phone and
the payment terminal – relaying each messages across
this extended distance. The attacker has the potential to
pay for services using the victim’s account if the attacker
is able to relay these messages successfully without de-
tection.
With contactless smart cards, relay attacks are coun-
tered using distance bounding protocols [34] and variants
of such [24]; this is still an active research domain, with
new attacks and countermeasures emerging [27, 16, 14].
The aim of distance bounding protocols is to enable a
payment terminal (verifier) to enforce an upper bound
on its physical distance to a smart card (prover). The
enforcement of physical distance is achieved through pe-
riodic challenge-response exchange and timing the pro-
cess. If the response is received within a predefined
time (threshold), the verifier establishes that the prover
is within a specified physical distance. In a relay at-
tack, provers may be either malicious or genuine; veri-
fiers, however, are considered honest. If verifiers are ma-
licious and try to participate in a relay attack, then they
are effectively attacking themselves, thus defeating the
purpose of the attack. There is a possibility that a termi-
nal might play a unwitting victim, but so long as we do
not consider them to be physically modifying the (cer-
tified) payment terminals, then an anti-relay mechanism
can succeed.
A substantial portion of the work surrounding relay-
attack countermeasures for contactless smart cards re-
lates to distance bounding protocols [17, 20]. However,
these may not be feasible for NFC-enabled phones –
at the current state-of-the-art – due to their requirement
of high time-delay sensitivity and specialised hardware
[15, 23].
In the domain of NFC-based contactless mobile trans-
actions, several methods have been proposed to provide
some notion of proximity detection, most of which utilise
environmental (ambient) sensors present on modern mo-
bile handsets (for related work see Section 2.3). In the
following section, we discuss how ambient sensors have
been proposed to counter relay attacks in NFC-based mo-
bile contactless transactions.
2.2 Ambient Sensors for Proximity Detec-
tion
An ambient sensor measures a particular physical prop-
erty of its immediate surroundings, such as temperature,
light and sound. Modern smartphones and tablets, are
equipped with one or more of these sensors. The physi-
cal environment surrounding a smartphone (or a payment
terminal) can potentially provide a rich set of attributes
that might be unique to that location – the sound and
lighting of a quiet, brightly-lit room, for example – and
such information might be useful to implement proxim-
ity detection between two interacting devices.
In this section, we discuss a generic approach for de-
ploying ambient sensing as a proximity detection mecha-
nism that can be used in the context of mobile payments.
Figure 2 illustrates the entities involved in this process.
Variations of this approach are discussed below.
1. Independent Reporting. In this scenario, depicted
as solid lines in Figure 2, both the smartphone and
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payment terminal collect sensor measurements in-
dependent of each other and transmit these to a
trusted authority. This authority compares the sen-
sor measurements, based on some predefined com-
parison algorithm with set margins of error (thresh-
old), and decides whether the two devices were are
in proximity of each other.
2. Payment Terminal Dependent Reporting. This
setup, depicted as double-dot-dash line in Figure
2, involves the smartphone encrypting the sensor
measurements with a shared key (between smart
phone and trusted authority) and transmitting the
encrypted message to the payment terminal. The
payment terminal sends its own measurements and
the smartphone’s to the trusted authority for com-
parison.
3. Payment Terminal (Localised) Evaluation. The
smartphone transmits its own measurement to the
payment terminal, which then compares it with its
own measurements locally; the payment terminal
then decides whether the smartphone is in proxim-
ity.
Regardless of how the user interacts with the payment
terminal, e.g. touching or tapping it with their device,
the overall deployment architecture falls under one of
the above scenarios. It can be observed that there is a
potential for a fourth scenario to have a mobile phone
perform the proximity analysis. However, as we con-
sider the payment terminal to be the (potentially) trusted
device, as per the discussion in Section 2.1 and the smart-
phone might be with a malicious entity, this scenario is
not discussed.
2.3 Related Work
As noted previously, distance bounding protocols might
not be suitable for mobile based contactless transactions.
In existing work, therefore, ambient sensors have been
proposed as a strong proximity detection mechanism to
counter relay attacks, which is discussed as below.
Drimer et al. [17] and Ma et al. [30] showed how
location-related data, namely using GPS (Global Posi-
tioning System), can be used to determine the proximity
of two NFC mobile phones. Ma et al. use a ten second
window with location information collected every sec-
ond, which was subsequently compared across various
devices. The authors report a high success rate in identi-
fying the devices in close proximity to one another.
Halevi et al. [23] demonstrated the suitability of us-
ing ambient sound and light for proximity detection.
Here, the authors analysed the sensor measurements –
collected for 2 and 30 seconds duration for light and au-
dio respectively – using a range of similarity compari-
son algorithms. Extensive experiments were performed
in different physical locations, with a high success rate
of detecting co-located devices.
Varshavsky et al. [38] based their proximity detection
mechanism on the shared radio environment of devices –
the presence of WiFi access points and associated signal
strengths – using the application scenario of secure de-
vice pairing. In this work, they considered this approach
to produce low error rates, recommending it as a proxim-
ity detection mechanism. While their paper did not focus
on NFC-based mobile transactions, their techniques and
methodology may still be applicable.
Urien et al. [37] use ambient temperature with an el-
liptic curve-based RFID/NFC authentication protocol to
determine whether two devices are co-located. Using
this method, they were successful in establishing a se-
cure channel; the proposal combines the timing channels
in RFID, traditionally used in distance bounding proto-
cols, in conjunction with ambient temperature. Their
proposal, however, was not implemented and so there is
no experimental data provided to evaluate its efficacy.
Mehrnezhad et al. [33] proposed the use of an ac-
celerometer to provide assurance that the mobile phone
is within the vicinity of the payment terminal. Their pro-
posal requires the user to tap the payment terminal twice
in succession, after which the sensor streams of the de-
vice and the payment terminal are compared for simi-
larity. It is difficult to deduce the total time it took to
complete one transaction in its entirety, but the authors
have provided a sensor recording time range of 0.6–1.5
seconds.
Table 1: Related Work in Sensors as Anti-Relay Mecha-
nism
Paper Sensor
Sample Contactless
Duration Suitability
Ma et al. [30] GPS 10 seconds Possibly Not
Halevi et al. [23]
Audio 30 seconds Possibly Not
Light 2 seconds Potentially
Varshavsky et al. [38]
WiFi
1 second Potentially
(Radio Waves)
Urien et al. [37] Temperature N/A -
Mehrnezhad et al. [33] Accelerometer 0.6 to 1.5 Seconds Potentially
We summarise the related work in Table 1, and use
sensor sampling durations to determine whether a given
approach is suitable for contactless NFC mobile phone
transactions, namely in banking and transportation. ‘Pos-
sibly not’ are those proposals whose sample duration is
so large that they may not be adequate for mobile-based
services that substitute contactless cards, whereas those
whose sample range can be considered reasonable in cer-
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tain applications are labelled as ‘Potentially’ in the Table
1. However, even schemes denoted as ‘Potentially’ may
not be suitable for certain domains, such as banking or
transport applications, where a strict upper-bound is of-
ten present in which to complete the entire transaction.
In these domains, the goal is to serve people as quickly
as possible to maximise customer throughput, so time is
critical in determining whether a transaction is successful
and, indeed, permitted; an optimum transaction duration
would be in milliseconds, rather than seconds. We will
return to the discussion about transaction duration limits
later in Section 3.2.
Ambient sensing is also used in user-device authenti-
cation, key generation and establishment of secure chan-
nels. These applications typically measure the environ-
ment for longer periods of time (>1 second) and, gener-
ally speaking, their primary goal is not proximity detec-
tion. As such, we do not discuss them in this section.
The field of ambient sensors for proximity detection in
NFC-based mobile services is expanding, as illustrated
by the number of proposals that currently exist. In this
paper we extend the discussion to a large set of ambient
sensors. We evaluate the suitability of sensors proposed
currently and investigate a range of sensors not yet ex-
plored as an anti-relay mechanism in related work. Table
2 shows that we have undertaken a comprehensive evalu-
ation of ambient sensors for proximity detection (fifteen
in total). In existing literature, only five of these sensors
are proposed and evaluated as proximity detection mech-
anism (Table 1).
3 Framework for Evaluating Ambient
Sensors
In this section, we describe the test-bed that was devel-
oped to test, analyse and evaluate the effectiveness of
using various ambient sensors as a proximity detection
mechanism. The results of the evaluation are presented
in Section 5.
3.1 Evaluation Framework: Theory
The aim of this work is to evaluate the effectiveness of
ambient sensors as a proximity detection mechanism for
high security mobile contactless transactions; to this end,
we devised an evaluation framework discussed below.
For a particular ambient sensor, we collect sensor mea-
surements on the Payment Terminal (PT) and the Pay-
ment Instrument (PI), and these measurements are re-
ferred to as a transaction pair comprising PT and PI. We
collected a set (Equation 1) of these transaction pairs,
each containing i transactions in total, by performing a
field trial at four different locations on a university cam-
pus.
{(PT1, PI1),(PT2, PI2), . . . ,(PTi, PIi)} (1)
For each transaction pair, we calculate the similarity
between PT and PI. We refer to this as V, and thus our
set (Equation 1) now has three entries per transaction, as
shown in Equation 2.
{(PT1, PI1, V1),(PT2, PI2, V2), . . . ,(PTi, PIi, Vi)} (2)
From this set, we compute the Equal Error Rate
(EER) threshold associated with each sensor by plotting
the False Positive Rate (FPR) and False Negative Rate
(FNR) curves, and locating the point at which they inter-
sect.
In the context of our analysis, a False Positive is when
a genuine pair2 of PT and PI is not considered to be mea-
sured by devices that are in proximity to each other under
a selected threshold (Vx). Conversely, a False Negative is
when a PTi matches to be in proximity to another PI j
(where i 6= j) under the genuine and corresponding sim-
ilarity value Vi (threshold as threhold).
For the FPR curve, we select PTj and Vj and iterate
through n elements of the set, such that n = 1,2,3, . . . , i
except where n = j. For each of the n elements, if Vj <
Vn then the corresponding transaction (call it Tn) would
result in False Positive. Rationale for this is, as we know
that the Tn is a genuine transaction, but because to the
Vj is smaller than the related Vn, the transaction will be
declined if Vj is the selected threshold.
For the FNR curve we select a value of Vj, then it-
erate through all the n elements of the set such that
n = 1,2,3, . . . , i except n = j. For each of the nth ele-
ment, we only take PIn and compute the similarity, Vjn,
between PTj and PIn. If the Vj > Vjn then the result is
a False Negative. The rationale behind this is that for a
set of genuine transaction elements, (PTj and Vj), there
exists another PI that can be accepted – other than the
genuine value PI j. In this analysis, Vjn is considered as
the selected threshold.
In this section, some of the explanations were simpli-
fied for brevity and to avoid the nuances of sensor mea-
surements and comparison techniques. In subsequent
sections, we expand the discussion on the above points
and provide a more detailed account of how we imple-
mented the test-bed and evaluated the sensors data for
each transaction.
3.2 Test-bed Architecture
Two applications were implemented and installed on
pairs of Android devices, one as a payment terminal
2A genuine (value, transaction or pair) is a measurement(s) that we
have collected during our trails and we have the evidence that they were
taken from devices that were in close proximity to each other.
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and the other as the payment instrument (mobile phone).
When the devices touch, an NFC connection is es-
tablished and both begin recording data using a pre-
specified sensor. Upon successful completion of the
measurements, each device stores the recorded data in
a local database, shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Test-bed Architecture
A more detailed view of this process is depicted in Fig-
ure 4. Bringing the two devices together causes the PT
application to send a message to the PI, stating which
sensor it uses in the transaction, along with a unique
transaction ID.
After this message is received by the PI, both appli-
cations initiate the process to record a measurement, by
storing values returned by a sensor. The recording pro-
cess lasts 500ms – the maximum permitted time in which
a contactless payment transaction should complete in ac-
cordance with the “EMV Contactless Specifications for
Payment Systems: Book A” [10] and additional indus-
trial specifications [7, 8, 11]. This time limit will be
reduced gradually to 400ms from 2016 onward. For
transport-related transactions, the performance require-
ments are stricter, where transaction times should not ex-
ceed 300ms [6, 18].
PT PI
1) sensor—transaction ID
recordSensor() recordSensor()
validateReceivedData()
2) sensor—transaction ID
saveMeasurement()validateReceivedData()
saveMeasurement()
Figure 4: Measurement Recording Overview
After completing the measurements, the PI validates
the data it received from the terminal (in message one),
returning a completion or rejection message accordingly.
This is along with which sensor was used on the PI and
the transaction ID received from the PT in message one.
This validation process ensures that the two devices were
recording data from the same sensor. Finally, the PT
verifies the data received from the PI, ensuring that the
PI was measuring the same transaction, using the trans-
action ID and whether the two devices were recording
from the same sensor. Upon validation, the devices save
the measurements in their local databases. In the event
of any inconsistencies during the exchange, i.e. the de-
vices recorded data for differing transaction IDs, then
the measurement is rejected. The database is designed to
hold measurements for each transaction, which are used
to analyse and evaluate the effectiveness of each sensor.
3.3 Data Collection Framework
To gauge the sensor variance in physical locations and
how this influences proximity detection, we test each
sensor in four different locations around the university:
the lab, cafeteria, dining hall and library. A field trail was
conducted in each location with 252 participants sup-
plied a varying number of transactions, with each pro-
viding a minimum of one transaction per sensor.
Table 2: Sensor Availability
Sensors Nexus 9 (1) Nexus 9 (2) Nexus 5 SGS5 mini
PT-PI Pair: Nexus 9 (1)→ Nexus 9 (2)
Accelerometer 3 3 3 3
Bluetooth ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
GRV† 3 3 ∗ 3
GPS ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Gyroscope 3 3 3 3
Magnetic Field 3 3 3 3
Network Location 3 3 3 3
Pressure 3 3 3 7
Rotation Vector ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Sound 3 3 3 ∗
WiFi ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
PT-PI Pair: SGS5 mini→ Nexus 5
Gravity ◦ ◦ 3 3
Light ∗ ∗ 3 3
Linear Acceleration ◦ ◦ 3 3
Proximity 7 7 3 3
Unsupported
Humidity 7 7 7 7
Temperature 7 7 7 7
3: Working properly. 7: Not present on device. ∗: Technical limitations.
◦: Only returning 0s.
† Geomagnetic Rotation Vector
Four devices were used in the experiments, forming
two PT-PI device pairs. The first consisted of two Nexus
9 tablets, while the second pair comprised two Android
smartphones: a Nexus 5, assuming the role of the pay-
ment terminal and a Samsung Galaxy S5 mini (SGS5
mini), acting as the payment instrument. The availabil-
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ity of the sensors on each device can be found in Ta-
ble 2, along with which sensors comprised each of the
two pairs discussed before.
Sensors with technical limitations – Bluetooth, GPS,
Rotation Vector and WiFi – although present on the de-
vices, returned no or very few data points (>99% sensor
failure3) within the 500ms timeframe. The specific limi-
tations for each of these sensors are described in more
detail in Appendix B. Two sensors, the humidity and
the temperature sensors, are relatively uncommon among
Android devices and none of our tested devices contained
them, thus we excluded them from this study.
A minimum of 1000 transactions – measurement pairs
for which both PT and PI have corresponding sensor data
– were recorded for each sensor. 700 measurements for
each sensor were recorded in the Lab, with 100 in each
of the remaining locations.
The Android operating system returns data captured
by a sensor in time intervals set by the application.
To prevent unnecessary power consumption, the sen-
sor values are returned by the operating system only
when the values have altered. The sound sensor (mi-
crophone), however, captures data in a continuous, un-
interrupted stream. In this instance, the applications con-
vert the recorded amplitudes into sound pressure levels
(in decibels) before storing the values in their respective
databases. With Bluetooth, data is sent from the operat-
ing system to the application every time a new Bluetooth
device is discovered; with WiFi, this is once the device
has completed scanning the presence of nearby access
points.
On each device (PT and PI), each transaction gener-
ated a single database record containing the sensor val-
ues measured over 500ms. The recorded sensor measure-
ments were subsequently stored in the database in XML
form. Every time sensor values were returned, a new
child element was created containing the sequence ID
of the measurement, the timestamp (initialised to zero at
the start of the transaction), along with the recorded sen-
sor measurements. A sample XML record can be found
in Listing 1. The data measurements – whether a sen-
sor returned one or multiple values per sample – were
saved in a generic format (e.g. data0, data1, etc.) for
convenience, and later assigned to their actual units dur-
ing the analysis phase, in accordance with the Android
documentation [3]. Details for each sensor can be found
in Appendix A.
The sequence ID of each measurement, the date and
time the transaction occurred, the location in which it
was captured, and the transaction ID were also stored in
the database.
The transaction ID is a random 7-byte string generated
3Detailed in Section 5.2 and Table 5
Listing 1: Sample XML Record
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2 <measurements>
3 ....
4 <measurement>
5 <id>6</id>
6 <timestamp>60</timestamp>
7 <data0>-0.32935655</data0>
8 <data1>6.2396774</data1>
9 <data2>-7.558329</data2>
10 </measurement>
11 ....
12 </measurements>
by the terminal, used to assist in linking the measure-
ments of each device to represent a single transaction.
Occasionally, the connection is disrupted when the mo-
bile device has already replied to the terminal (message
2 in figure 4) while the terminal has not yet finished pro-
cessing it. As a result, the measurement is stored only on
the mobile device; this occurs typically when the two de-
vices are moved apart before the end of the transaction.
To counter this, the transaction ID is used in conjunction
with the sequence ID to detect and exclude these mea-
surements during the analysis phase.
After completing the experiments, the databases were
extracted from the devices via USB and transferred to the
PC running the analysis software.
3.4 Data Analysis and Evaluation Criteria
After retrieving the databases from the terminal and mo-
bile, the set of all transactions, T , was produced using the
shared IDs generated during data collection. Each trans-
action may be thought of as the set of PT and PI values,
PTi and PIi, with the same shared ID, i.e. Ti = (PTi,PIi).
Whereas, each of the devices (PT and PI) will measure
an array of data for each sensor at different time inter-
vals. Therefore, PTi = PTi1,PTi2, . . . ,PTin. Similarly, PIi
is also a set of data vales collected by mobile during the
Ti. A more detailed discussion on this is in Section 4.3
and depicted in Figure 5.
A Python application was developed for analysing
the transaction measurements from the application
databases, employing the SciPy library [28] for numer-
ical computation.
2r4 arcsin
(√
sin2
φ2−φ1
2
+ cosφ1 cosφ2 sin2
λ2−λ1
2
)
(3)
4r represents the radius of Earth: 6371km
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MAE(PTi,PIi) =
1
N
N
∑
j=0
|PTi, j−PIi, j| (4)
corr(PTi,PIi) =
covariance(PTi,PIi)
σPTi ·σPIi
(5)
M =
√
x2 + y2 + z2 (6)
To compare (PTi,PIi), we measure the similarity dis-
tance between the two, which was measured differently
according to sensor type. The reason behind this is how
individual sensors are deployed in Android environment
and number of variables returned in each data element
during a transaction. To explain this further, during each
transaction Ti, a PT and PI collect data from the selected
sensor over a period of 500ms. During this interval, de-
pending upon a sensor, a varying number of data ele-
ments is collected. Each of these elements might contain
one or more variables, for example, network location has
two variables, accelerometer has three and temperature
has only one variable per data element. Due to this, we
devised three different methods of dealing with this di-
versity in the sensor data reporting.
For network location, this was calculated using the
Haversine formula (Eq. 3), which measures the geo-
graphic distance between two latitude and longitude
pairs, {(φ1,λ1),(φ2,λ2)}.
For the remaining sensors, similarity was measured
using the mean absolute error (MAE, Eq. 4) and cor-
relation coefficient (Eq. 5), as used in [33], between the
signals of PTi and PIi, with each containing N measure-
ments. Over the series of N data values per PTi and
PIi, we calculate the covariance to understand the over-
all change between the collected data (per transaction).
Whereas, σPTi and σPIi is the mean of all the data points
in PTi and PIi, respectively.
Certain sensors – the accelerometer, gyroscope, mag-
netic field, rotation vector and GRV sensors – produce
a vector of values comprising x, y and z components. In
these instances, the vector magnitude (Eq. 6) was used as
a general-purpose method for producing a single, com-
bined value prior to computing the MAE and correlation
coefficient.
4 Challenges
In this section, we discuss the challenges encountered in
implementing the test-bed, during data collection and in
analysing and evaluating the collected data. The discus-
sion is of value not only to the academic experimentation
purposes but for actually testing a real deployment in the
field – based on ambient sensors to provide proximity
detection.
4.1 Implementation Challenges
A number of challenges were encountered during the im-
plementation phase, particularly in relation to recording
sufficient sensor values in a relatively short time period.
The clocks of the two devices involved in a transac-
tion cannot be expected to be completely synchronised,
particularly in a real-world deployment. In order for the
measurements on the devices to start as close to each
other as possible, we perform the transaction validity
checks after the recordings have finished. The validity
checks involve verifying that both devices are measuring
the same sensor and there is a unique transaction ID for
the measurement. The recorded measurement is rejected
at the end of the transaction in the event of the a validity
check failure.
To capture the maximum possible amount of data,
the applications were designed such that no threads, or
other process-intense components, were used prior to
the initialisation of the measurement recording (other
than those started by the Android API automatically).
The threads initiated by the Android API monitored any
changes in the sensor values during a transaction.
The sound sensor’s development was relatively chal-
lenging. Typically, to avoid any problems, the micro-
phone should be accessed from within a separate thread,
otherwise the NFC communication stops for as long as
the microphone is being used. Initiating a thread prior
to accessing the microphone had an impact in the per-
formance of the application, leading to no data being
recorded in 500ms. To overcome this issue, we mea-
sured 500ms chunks of sensor data in the devices, and
not worrying about the loss of NFC connection during
the transaction.
Ensuring that the recording of each sensor will not ex-
ceed 500ms was a high priority requirement that faced
a number of challenges. A common way to run a task
for a specific duration of time in Java is by using a timer
inside a thread. Since the timer is initiated after the cre-
ation of a thread, which is a process intense procedure,
there is no guarantee that the measurement will last for
no more than 500ms since the initiation of the transac-
tion. To overcome this issue, we track the system time
on the terminal side when it sends the first message to the
device and on the mobile device side, when it receives the
first message from the terminal. A loop ensures that mea-
surements after the 500ms timeframe will not be stored
and the recording will terminate.
The HostApduService class was used for the imple-
mentation of the mobile device application, which is ca-
pable of emulating an NFC card on an Android handset,
and is the basis of implementing a Host Card Emulation
(HCE) service [4]. HCE was introduced on Android 4.4
(API level 19), therefore the handset that acts as the PI in
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Figure 5: Linear Interpolation to Mitigate the Effect of Missing and Inconsistent Sampling Rate – An Example from
Accelerometer-based Transactions
the experiment should be running Android 4.4 or later.
The data from the sensors was retrieved in time inter-
vals of 10ms. Although the SGS5 mini device was ca-
pable of collecting data at a higher frequency (less than
1ms), the fastest common value across all our devices
was 10ms.
4.2 Data Collection Challenges
Here, we discuss a selection of challenges faced during
the data collection process.
Although the sampling rate for retrieving sensor val-
ues was set to 10ms, we encountered variance in the in-
tervals that sensors returned data, as well as in the gran-
ularity of values provided across different devices. As
mentioned previously, only when there is a significant
change in the values recorded by a sensor are they re-
turned to the application [2]. As we are using a relatively
small sampling rate (10ms), it is possible that there was
no change in the values observed by the sensor, so no
data was returned. Another reason relates to other pro-
cesses, services and daemons running in the background
that may also be causing slight delays to the frequency
that an application is notified about sensor changes. Dur-
ing our experiments we ensured these delays were lim-
ited by uninstalling process intense applications and dis-
abling any background services. However, such precau-
tions cannot be enforced in a real-world, wide-scale de-
ployment by a general mobile application. However,
a well embedded application into the Android platform
with process priority and isolation might avoid it.
Various sensors – WiFi, GPS and Bluetooth – were
excluded from the study, since they were not capable of
returning any useful data in the 500ms timeframe. We
performed an initial limited experiment in which we only
took 100 transactions per sensor prior to the data collec-
tion phase, and found that 100% of these transactions
from WiFi and GPS sensors contained little or no mea-
surement data (i.e. at least one nearby WiFi access point
or Bluetooth device). For Bluetooth, 99% of the transac-
tions contained little or no data points. As a result, they
were excluded from the rest of our analysis.
Table 3: Time Required for Receiving Results from Sen-
sors
Sensor Average time Minimum time Maximum time
Bluetooth 962.7ms 354ms 1960ms
WiFi 3873.5ms 3795ms 3954ms
A separate application was built to measure the aver-
age time required for the WiFi and Bluetooth sensors to
capture sufficient data. The GPS sensor’s speed and ac-
curacy are very dependent on the environment in which
it is being tested. The results for 50 sensor measurements
for the WiFi and the Bluetooth are presented in Table 3.
4.3 Data Analysis Challenges
During the data analysis, we faced a number of chal-
lenges. Below is a list of some selected challenges that
we had to overcome.
After acquiring the data from the PT and PI, we used
linear interpolation to mitigate the effect of missing and
inconsistent samples due to the unwanted variation in
sampling rates (steps 1 and 2 of Figure 5).
Data sampling rarely finished at 500ms precisely: Fig-
ure 6 illustrates that the reader’s final sample occurs at
≈490ms, while the card finished at ≈460ms. To counter
this, interpolation was performed up to the maximum
time period shared by both devices (460ms) and any sam-
ples beyond this point were discarded.
Correlation, however, is sensitive to this type of trun-
cation: if relatively extreme values are discarded, such
as the reader’s measurements between 0-100ms in Fig-
ure 6, then correlation may differ significantly. Thus, for
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Figure 6: Example Magnetic Field transaction illustrat-
ing differing finishing times for the PT and PI
computing correlation we avoid truncation.
Only one measurement was collected at maximum –
if any were collected at all – when analysing network lo-
cation for all transactions. Since correlation is undefined
for a single point, we calculated only the MAE for this
particular modality.
For 43% of gyroscope-based transactions (430 of
1000), a value of zero was measured for the entire trans-
action on the PT and/or PI, indicating that the device
was not perturbed sufficiently to alter the sensor’s rest-
ing value. Correlation is undefined for a single point,
so these transactions were discarded for the correlation
analysis. This also suggests that gyroscope sensor might
not be a suitable sensor for mobile based contactless
transactions.
On one device (SGS5 mini), the light sensor returned
values far more frequently than the other. With the Nexus
5, only one light measurement was captured on average
during the 500ms timeframe, while the SGS5 mini col-
lected 48–50 measurements. Rather than truncating a
significant number of measurements, we assumed5 that
all of the Nexus 5 values lay on a straight line, with a gra-
dient of zero, and calculated the MAE using this. Note
that correlation is undefined in this case.
The proximity sensor on both tested devices (Nexus
5 and SGS5 mini – see Table 4) returned only a binary
value, representing near and far, rather than the precise
proximity of the device to an object in centimetres. The
Android documentation states that “some” devices pro-
5Our assumption is based on the Android sensor API implementa-
tion and potentially the capability of the light sensor on Nexus 5. In
which if the sensor value do not change, the Android API do not re-
turn any new values. For this reason, we assumed that for the complete
duration of 500ms, the light sensor value didn’t change from the first
reported value.
vide a binary value rather than a real value [1]. In our
dataset, both devices reported far for all transactions.
The reasoning for this is because the proximity sensor is
located on the front of the device and NFC being on the
back of the devices. To tab two handset for NFC trans-
action, you have to touch the backsides of the devices
with each other, which does not interact with proximity
sensor as they are located at the front. Thus both devices
reporting the values as “far”.
5 Ambient Sensor Evaluation
In this section, we describe our methodology in detail
to calculate False Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative
Rate (FNR) and Equal Error Rate (EER). Furthermore,
we present the results of our analysis for each individual
sensor.
5.1 Calculating the FPR, FNR and EER
As discussed in Section 3.1 and 3.4, each transaction,
Ti, comprises a set of PTi and PIi measurements (Equa-
tion 1). From this data, we compute the MAE(PTi,PIi)
and corr(PTi,PIi) for each successful transaction (col-
lective we called them Vi in Equation 2). We calcu-
late the FPR, FNR and EER of each sensor by test-
ing the MAE and corr of the set of genuine transaction
pairs6, (PTi,PIi), against the MAE and corr of unau-
thorised pairs (PTi,PI j) using some threshold, t. Ide-
ally, Vi(PTi,PI j)< t and Vi j(PTi,PI j)> t for all possible
pairs.
The FPR and FNR are calculated using Equation 7,
where FP, FN, TP and TN represent the total number of
False Positives, False Negatives, True Positives and True
Negatives respectively for a given threshold.
FPR =
FP
FP+T N
FNR =
FN
FN +T P
(7)
To elaborate upon this further, the pseudo-code for cal-
culation of the FPR is given in Listing 2:
Listing 2: Calculating False Positive Rate
1 /* Pseudocode to calculate FPR data points */
2 int t = Tested_Threshold;
3 int maxint = Number_of_Transactions;
4 int FPS = 0; // False positives
5 int TNS = 0; // True negatives
6 for (int i = 1; i <= maxint; i++) {
7 for (int j = 1; j <= maxint; j++) {
8 if (i != j) {
9 calculateMAE(PTi, Mj);
10 if (MAE(PTi, PIj) < t)
11 FPS++;
12 else
6From trail data to be pairs from device that are in proximity to each
other
10
13 TNS++;
14 }
15 }
16 }
17 double FPR = FPS / (FPS + TNS);
18 write(FPR);
The calculation of FPR based on corr follows the same
algorithm, only substituting MAE with the corr function.
To calculate the False Negative Rate (FNR), we imple-
mented the algorithm described in Listing 3. As with
FPR, substituting MAE for corr in Listing 3 allows us to
generate an FNR curve based on correlation.
Listing 3: Calculating False Negative Rate
1 /* Pseudocode to calculate FNR data points */
2 int t = Test_Threshold;
3 int maxint = Number_of_Transactions;
4 int FNS = 0; // False negatives
5 int TPS = 0; // True positives
6 for (int i = 1; i <= maxint; i++) {
7 calculateMAE(PTi, PIi)
8 if (MAE(PTi, PIi) < t)
9 TPS++;
10 else
11 FNS++;
12 }
13 double FNR = FNS / (FNS + TPS);
14 write(FNR);
5.2 Individual Sensor Results
The aim of our evaluation is to investigate to what ex-
tent legitimate and illegitimate transactions can be iden-
tified using these similarity metrics. For a transaction
between two co-located devices, then MAE(PTi,PIi)≈ 0
and corr(PTi,PIi) ≈ 1, while for a PT and PI device in
differing locations, i.e. (PTi,PI j), the distance and cor-
relation should be sufficiently large. What is consid-
ered ‘sufficient’ is determined through finding a suit-
able threshold, t, which permits all legitimate transac-
tions while denying those which are illegitimate, i.e.
Vi(PTi,PIi) < t and Vi j(PTi,PI j) > t, as mentioned pre-
viously. For each individual sensor, we aim to find an
optimal value of t, along with its reliability.
We generate FPR and FNR curves for MAE and corr
for every sensor we were able to collect data. The
point of intersection for these curves provides an optimal
threshold for MAE and corr based on its associated EER,
i.e. the rate at which the acceptance and rejection errors
are equal. Figure 7 shows the FPR and FNR curves for
the accelerometer (based on MAE calculations), along
with the optimum threshold and EER. Appendix A in-
cludes the EER graphs for all of the tested sensors (ex-
cept Accelerometer), based on both MAE and corr.
Figure 7 illustrates that the optimum threshold (based
on the MAE) is 0.651, with an associated EER of 0.506.
1 2 3 4 5
Threshold (ms−2 )
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
R
a
te
Accelerometer
False Negative
False Positive
Figure 7: FPR and FNR Graph for an Accelerometer-
based Transactions using MAE(PTi,PIi)
A threshold of 0.651ms−2, therefore, one can expect the
proportion of false positives and false negatives to be
50.6%.
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Similarly, for correlation, Figure 8 shows that the EER
(0.523) produces an optimal threshold of 0.007. If we use
the corr as the comparison criterion, the rate of false pos-
itives and negatives is approximately 52%. Table 4 lists
the optimum thresholds and associated EERs for each
tested sensor.
In a wide-scale deployment of an ambient sens-
ing proximity detection mechanism, a single threshold
should be defined. The terminal (or third party) would
store this threshold (Section 2.2), and if the similarity of
the terminal’s and device’s sensor readings was within
this, then the transaction would be assumed to be legiti-
mate, i.e. both devices in close proximity. However, set-
ting a threshold of this nature invariably incurs some rate
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Table 4: Optimum Thresholds and Associated Risk
Sensors Optimum EERMAE
Optimum
EERcorrThresholdMAE Thresholdcorr
Accelerometer 0.651 0.506 0.007 0.523
Bluetooth – – – –
GRV 0.499 0.615 0.006 0.518
GPS – – – –
Gyroscope 0.520 0.504 0.007 0.752
Magnetic Field 77.33 0.334 0.235 0.582
Network Location 8.532 0.369 N/A∗ N/A
Pressure 2.787 0.270 0.329 0.645
Rotation Vector – – – –
Sound 10.19 0.395 -0.087 0.524
WiFi – – – –
Gravity 9.5e-05 0.506 0.020 0.534
Light 178.5 0.518 0.020 0.515
Linear Acceleration 1.348 0.514 0.087 0.491
Proximity N/A† N/A N/A N/A
∗Insufficient data to calculate correlation
†All transactions contained the same value for both devices. Consequently, EER
is undefined.
of false positives and false negatives. The intersection
of FPR and FNR provides us with the proportion of po-
tentially malicious transactions might passing as genuine
(false positives) and the proportion of genuine transac-
tions being rejected (false negatives). The goal of a ma-
licious entity would be to carry out relay attacks such
that the sensor measurements at the terminal and mo-
bile phone remained within the predefined threshold. A
threshold with a higher FPR provides a large working
space to the attacker, whereas a higher FNR will reduce
the usability of the scheme, potentially frustrating con-
sumers by rejecting legitimate transactions.
Besides investigating the EERs of sensors and the ef-
fect this has on their suitability for NFC mobile ser-
vices, we evaluate the reliability and potential usability
of the selected sensors. This analysis, shown in Table 5,
presents our findings regarding the proportion of failed
transactions and sensor failures.
To collect 1000 transactions from 252 users (for each
sensor), as explained in Section 3.3, we requested users
to present the PI to the PT as many times as they pre-
ferred. We established walk-in counters at four different
locations of the university campus and students walking
nearby by were invited to assist us in the trail. We do
not take any demographic data about the students as sen-
sors are not used to identify a user, but to assure that two
devices were in close proximity to each other during a
transaction. At times, transactions were not registered
during this process, usually due to the user moving the
handset away too quickly, and was the primary cause of
transaction failures7 (no shared measurements between
the PT and PI) represented in Table 5. The rate of sensor
failures, in the same table, represents the situation when
the transaction was successfully completed on both the
7These failed transactions were not included in the data analysis
and results represented in Table 4, which is based on successful 1000
transactions.
Table 5: Usability and Reliability Analysis
Sensors Total Transaction SensorTransactions Failures Failures
Accelerometer 1025 13 (1.26%) 0 (0%)
Bluetooth 101 1 (0.99%) 99 (99%)
GRV 1019 8 (0.78%) 0 (0%)
GPS 101 1 (0.99%) 100 (100%)
Gyroscope 1022 11 (1.07%) 0 (0%)
Magnetic Field 1027 17 (1.65%) 0 (0%)
Network Location 1053 15 (1.42%) 960 (96%)
Pressure 1018 10 (0.98%) 0 (0%)
Rotation Vector 1023 14 (1.36%) 0 (0%)
Sound 1047 4 (0.38%) 0 (0%)
WiFi 100 0 (0%) 100 (100%)
Gravity 1165 143 (12.27%) 0 (0%)
Light 1057 37 (3.50%) 0 (0%)
Linear Acceleration 1175 159 (13.53%) 3 (0.3%)
Proximity 1071 58 (5.41%) 0 (0%)
PT and PI, but where one or both devices failed to record
any data in the 500ms timeframe. The percentage of
transaction failures relates to the total transactions, while
sensor failures is measured with respect to the number of
successful transactions. The transactions failure repre-
sents the difficulty in using the sensors by the user, while
the sensor failure rates reflects their reliability.
6 Outcome and Future Directions
The results we present provide us with an empirical foun-
dation for evaluating the suitability of various mobile
sensors as a proximity detection mechanism for NFC-
based mobile transactions. As discussed in the previous
section, the higher the EER, the greater the likelihood
that an attack passes undetected and that a genuine trans-
action is rejected. Based on our analysis, it is difficult to
recommend any of the sensors (individually) for a high
security deployment application, such as banking. These
sensors, however, might be appropriate for low-security
access control, but we recommend that a thorough anal-
ysis of the sensors and their performance in the chosen
domain is performed prior to deployment.
One potential reason that related research in this do-
main has achieved different results is due to the larger
sampling durations and limited field trails in other work.
The sample duration limit imposed during our experi-
ments was in line with the performance requirements of
an EMV application, i.e. 500 milliseconds. Additionally,
transportation is one of the biggest application areas of
contactless smart cards, along with banking; in this do-
main, the recommended duration for a transactions is far
lower, in the range of 300–400 milliseconds. Imposing
a limit of 500 millisecond in our experiments, therefore,
was based on the upper bound of the recommendations of
two significant application areas where contactless mo-
bile phones might be utilised.
Proposals that suggest that a user may initiate sensor
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measurements in advance of the actual transaction would
give us a far longer sample duration – potentially help-
ing in building a robust proximity detection mechanism.
We do not support this proposal at two points. Firstly,
they require the user to pre-empt a transaction, which, in
realistic scenarios, requires a task to be performed well
in advance before they can use their mobile device. Sec-
ondly, a user would have to start the measurement at a
distance from the PT, to potentially give PI more time
to measure a larger sample, which does not provide a
measurement of proximity. Furthermore, we do not sub-
scribe to the idea that proximity detection is unnecessary
because most mobile devices require a user’s PIN or bio-
metric to open a payment application. In the relay attack
variant known as a Mafia Attack, a malicious PT is de-
ployed by an attacker to trick genuine users to tap their
handset (PI) on it. In this attack scenario, a PIN or bio-
metric cannot protect against relay attacks.
During our experiments, we realised that sensors and
their associated platforms may not have the maturity re-
quired for a wide-scale deployment as a proximity detec-
tion mechanism for NFC-enabled phones. The variations
in sensor readings across devices, how the platform’s
sensor architecture is affected by other applications run-
ning simultaneously, and differences in minimum sam-
pling rates may vary across mobile device manufactur-
ers. We consider that mobile sensors have a considerable
way to go before achieving the necessary interoperabil-
ity, standardised specifications, and performance require-
ments to prevent relay attacks.
From the work carried out and the results presented
in this paper, we can claim with a high degree of confi-
dence that mobile sensors, at least in their current state
on Google Android devices, are not suitable for use as
an anti-relay mechanism. This is especially pertinent
in the case of applications with high security require-
ments, such as banking, transport and access-control at
highly sensitive sites. It may be argued that these sen-
sors might be suitable for low-risk application that do
not have stringent transaction time limits and distance
bounding assurance requirements. However, the devel-
oper ought to consider the risks highlighted in this paper,
i.e. EER rates at optimum thresholds. For each sensor,
we provide an EER graph that indicates the effectiveness
of the respective sensor and their associated risk if it was
deployed. From the data we have analysed we can safely
claim that mobile sensors, in their current state in most
of the Google Android devices, may not be suitable for
deployment as an anti-relay mechanism.
As part of our future research, we are currently exper-
imenting with:
• Collecting and evaluation a large data set of actual
relay attacks using these sensors, and investigating
if and how a relay attack in the field is reflected in
its sensor measurements.
• Can we simultaneously measures multiple sensors
within the transaction time duration? If so, will it
reduce the risk associated with these sensors indi-
vidually?
• Combining sensor measurements with time slices:
only one sensor is measured at a time, but over the
duration of the transaction multiple sensors could
be used.
• Is a location-specific deployment feasible? And will
it improve the success rate significantly if such an
approach is adopted?
7 Conclusion
The aim of the paper was to evaluate and analyse a range
of sensors present in modern day mobile devices, and
determining which sensors, if any, would be suitable as
a proximity detection mechanism in the domain of NFC
mobile phone transactions. We shortlisted 17 sensors ac-
cessible through the Google Android platform, before
limiting it to those which are widely-available. In ex-
isting literature, only five sensors have been proposed as
an effective proximity detection mechanism by authors
listed in Table 1. In this paper, we extend this with ten
additional sensors by evaluating their suitability and ef-
fectiveness as a proximity detection mechanism on NFC-
enabled mobile devices. In total, we implemented and
evaluated 15 sensors; three sensors WiFi, Bluetooth and
GPS were dropped after initial tests as they were show-
ing high sensor failure rates. The scope of our analy-
sis focuses on NFC-enabled mobile devices that emu-
late traditional smart card services, such as transportation
and banking. Any analysis or recommendation regarding
these sensors is restricted to mobile contactless transac-
tions that aim to substitute for the contactless smart card
transactions in high security applications (like banking,
transport and sensitive site’s access control). We have
neither evaluated nor claimed that similar results will be
produced in other deployment scenarios of mobile sen-
sors where distance bounding or security requirements,
and transaction time limit is not as stringent as in our
case (i.e traditional smart card services).
The experimentation and analysis carried out as part of
this paper showed that none of the sensors individually
suitable to be deployed as an proximity detection mech-
anism for NFC-based mobile transactions. Finally, we
will make the source code of our test-bed publicly avail-
able, along with our collected data sets, for open scrutiny
and further analysis.
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A Ambient Sensors
This appendix provides a short description of each sen-
sor.
A.1 Accelerometer
The accelerometer sensor – deployed in most modern
smartphones – measures the acceleration applied to the
device on the x, y and z axes; its units are metres per
second per second (ms−2). The EER graphs based on
the MAE(Ri,Mi) and corr(Ri,Mi) are represented in Fig-
ure 7 and 8 respectively.
A.2 Bluetooth
Bluetooth is a technology that facilitates wireless com-
munication and operates in the ISM band centred at 2.4
gigahertz. As a proximity sensor, we measure the Blue-
tooth devices in the vicinity (their names and MAC ad-
dresses).
A.3 Geomagnetic Rotation Vector (GRV)
The GRV sensor measures the rotation of the device us-
ing the device’s magnetometer and accelerometer; it re-
turns a vector containing the angles that the device is ro-
tated in the x, y and z axes. The EER graphs based on the
MAE(Ri,Mi) and corr(Ri,Mi) are represented in Figure
9a and 9b respectively.
A.4 Global Positioning System (GPS)
The GPS sensor based a satellite-based global position-
ing and velocity measurement. A latitude and longitude
pair is returned, representing a geographical location on
Earth.
A.5 Gravity
The gravity sensor on mobile handsets measures the ef-
fect of Earth’s gravity on the device, measured in metres
per second per second (ms−2). The EER graphs based
on the MAE(Ri,Mi) and corr(Ri,Mi) are represented in
Figure 9c and 9d respectively.
A.6 Gyroscope
The gyroscope measures the rate of rotation of the device
about the x, y and z axes; its units are radians per second
(rads−1). The EER graphs based on the MAE(Ri,Mi)
and corr(Ri,Mi) are represented in Figure 9e and 9f re-
spectively.
A.7 Light
The light sensor measures the lighting conditions sur-
rounding the mobile handset. Android measures this
quantity in lux. The EER graphs based on the
MAE(Ri,Mi) and corr(Ri,Mi) are represented in Figure
9m and 9n respectively.
A.8 Linear Acceleration
The linear acceleration sensor measures the affect of a
device’s movement on itself; its units are metres per sec-
ond per second (ms−2). The EER graphs based on the
MAE(Ri,Mi) and corr(Ri,Mi) are represented in Figure
9o and 9p respectively.
A.9 Magnetic Field
The magnetic field sensor detects the Earth’s magnetic
field along three perpendicular axes x, y and z. Android
measures these values in microteslas (µT ). The EER
graphs based on the MAE(Ri,Mi) and corr(Ri,Mi) are
represented in Figure 9q and 9r respectively.
A.10 Network Location
A latitude and longitude pair is returned, representing a
geographical location on Earth. The EER graphs based
on the MAE(Ri,Mi) is represented in Figure 8m.
A.11 Pressure
The pressure sensor measures the atmospheric pres-
sure surrounding the mobile handset. It is measured
in hectopascals (hPa). The EER graphs based on the
MAE(Ri,Mi) and corr(Ri,Mi) are represented in Figure
8n and 8o respectively.
A.12 Proximity
The proximity sensors detects distance, measured in cen-
timetres. In many devices the sensor returns only a
boolean value, declaring whether something is in close
proximity to the device or not.
A.13 Rotation Vector
Rotation vector is a software sensor, similar to the GRV,
but also incorporates the gyroscope. The returned values
represent the angles which the device has rotated through
the x, y and z axes.
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A.14 Sound
For the sound sensor’s measurement, we use the device’s
microphone to record the noise in the vicinity of the mo-
bile handsets and retrieve the maximum amplitude that
was sampled, every time it becomes available by the An-
droid operating system. The EER graphs based on the
MAE(Ri,Mi) and corr(Ri,Mi) are represented in Figure
8p and 8q respectively.
A.15 WiFi
This sensor uses traditional WiFi to detect the networks
in the vicinity of the mobile device. The MAC addresses
and ESSIDs of the nearby networks are returned.
B Technical limitations in sensors
• Bluetooth: Very few times (¡5% of all measure-
ments) data was returned in the 500ms timeframe
on all devices.
• Geomagnetic Rotation Vector: Although the sen-
sor is present on Nexus 5, no data was returned from
it.
• GPS: No data is returned in the 500ms timeframe
on any of the devices used in our experiments.
• Light: The Nexus 9 tablets return a limited amount
of values, in large intervals. Although the sensor
was functioning, the mobile devices were chosen
for the experiments, as they produce a much wider
range of values and higher accuracy.
• Rotation Vector: There were inconsistencies in
the readings recorded on any of the possible pairs,
therefore the sensor could not be evaluated properly.
This includes the two Nexus 9 tablets, although they
were the same model and were running the same
version of the operating system. Finally, the Nexus
5 did not return any results, although the sensor is
present on the device.
• Sound: No data is returned in the 500ms timeframe
on the SGS5 mini.
• WiFi: No data is returned in the 500ms timeframe
on any of the devices used in our experiments.
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Figure 9: FPR and FNR Graphs
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